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“Eating Well” The New Materialisation of Ideas: Contemporary Art, 
Transforming Experience and Relational Aesthetics 
 
This paper takes as it starting point a debate within art critical and historical circles of 
perhaps surprising longevity. Over the past five years the debate has continued 
concerning the phenomenon of “Relational Aesthetics” or “Relational Art”. The term 
“Relational Aesthetics” was one of the terms coined by the curator Nicholas Bourriard 
as a way of conceptualising various art practices emergent in the later 1990s and 
continuing to the present day which have as their ‘raison d’etre’ some form of social 
interaction or participation.1 As Bourriard has it: “an art that takes as its theoretical 
horizon the sphere of human interactions and its social context, rather than the 
assertion of an autonomous and private symbolic space”.2 
 
In terms of Relational Aesthetics one artist has become emblematic of the concept of 
‘relational art’ and the ‘ethico-political’ position its aesthetic subtends, as argued by 
Bourriaud. The Thai artist Rirkrit Tiravanija is perhaps best known for his Untitled 
(Still) 1992 at 303 Gallery New York. For this ‘work’ Tiravanija moved everything in 
the ‘back rooms’ of the gallery, the office and storeroom etc into the main exhibition 
space, where the gallery director thus had to work ‘in public’, turned the storeroom 
into an open kitchen for visitors and in the gallery cooked curries for visitors, the left-
overs of which further informed the ‘ex-verted’ exhibit space when the artist was not 
there. Similarly for a later work, Untitled (Tomorrow is Another Day) 1996 he 
installed a wooden reconstruction of his own apartment and opened it for use by 
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visitors, inviting them to ‘live’, i.e. cook and eat, wash, sleep and generally lounge in 
the living room. He has also extended his aspirations to encompass “The Land” as a 
‘massive-scale artist-run space’ designed as a collective for ‘social engagement’ in 
rural Thailand.  
 
Such work we may understand as problematising certain notions of ‘exchange’ 
between persons and social relations as infiltrated through and through by capitalist 
exchange relations, epitomised by the commodification of art through the gallery 
‘system’ by both ‘literally ‘exposing’ the gallery system and the artist as purveyor of 
commodity and offering an alternative as the ‘gift’ without return.  
 
A more resistant version of this challenge however may be found in the work of 
Thomas Hirschhorn who is not a major feature of “Relational Aesthetics”. Where we 
might say Tiravanija wants to deconstruct the autonomous, bureaucratised and 
commodified space of the gallery (and the autonomous figure of the artist, as further 
exemplified by his ‘private living space’) from within, Hirschhorn takes art out into 
‘illegitimate’ spaces and places and ‘trashes’ its ‘legitimate’ materials and forms of 
display in order to disturb the normal inscription of difference between ‘ privileged art 
public’ and the economically deprived groups who inhabit the locations of his works 
and by dint of that make the works their own.  
 
Bataille Monument 2002, in Documenta 11, was  a ‘make shift’ set of shacks, 
providing opportunities through books in a library, television and video installations 
and other visual ephemera to find out about and pay tribute to the life and work of the 
philosopher George Bataille, situated in the middle of a working class, predominantly 
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minority ethnic, Turkish, housing project in a suburb of Kassel, Germany (the venue 
for the Documenta), only to be reached by the visitors by way of trips by a Turkish 
cab company. The effect of this work, as Claire Bishop suggests, was to 
 
contrive a curious rapprochement between the influx of art tourists and the area’s 
residents. Rather than the local populace becoming subject to what he calls the ‘zoo 
effect’, Hirschhorn’s project made the art public feel like hapless intruders. Even 
more disruptively, in the light of the international art world’s intellectual pretensions, 
Monument took the local inhabitants seriously as potential Bataille readers…The 
complicated play of identificatory and dis-identificatory mechanisms at work…were 
radically and disruptively thought-provoking…the Bataille Monument served to 
destabilise (but also to potentially liberate) any sense of what community identity 
might be, or of what it means to be a ‘fan’ of art and philosophy.3 
 
More trenchantly and controversially perhaps, the exploitation inscribed in capitalist 
social relations is both repeated and critiqued in the work of Santiago Sierra who 
again does not feature in “Relational Aesthetics” but forms part of the critical 
literature responding to it.  An array of his works: 250 cm Line Tattooed on Six Paid 
People 1999; Workers Who Cannot be Paid, Remunerated to Remain Inside 
Cardboard Boxes 2000; The Wall of a Gallery Pulled Out, Inclined Sixty Degrees 
from the Ground and Sustained by Five People 2000; Persons Paid to Have their 
Hair Dyed Blond 2001;Wall Enclosing a Space, 2003,  both foreground the 
exploitative nature of labour and the reduction of social relations to a relationship 
between things, as well as folding the artist into this ‘critical’ situation as an exploiter 
himself.  
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Such works could be seen as dystopian nihilistic renderings of both ‘life as it lived’ 
for many people not often acknowledged in the ‘art world’ and of the exploitative 
relation that very lack of acknowledgement has inscribed within it. Arguably they are 
more than this to the extent that his work does indeed spill out into and across the 
‘unmentionables’ of immigration, contemporary ‘enslavement’ to ‘slave-wage’ labour 
and precarious means of making one’s living. Bishop suggests, “The work does not 
offer an experience of human empathy… but a pointed racial/economic non 
identification, ‘this is not me’”.4 
 
One could broadly say that all these works share a desire to both newly ‘work’ a 
notion of art’s autonomy and resistance to commodification in the very heteronomy of 
these ‘relational practices’ as ‘echoes’ of everyday life which yet ‘re-mark’ and bring 
the inequities and commodified reaches of everyday life to the fore.  
 
The criticisms levelled against Bourriard’s concept of relational aesthetics have 
revolved around a re-visiting of various inflections of Marxist and Post-Marxist 
arguments in respect to art. I want to consider these but will ultimately move to an 
argument coming from a slightly different place, more closely aligned to how I see 
Derrida’s views of art and politics and how we might view art and how we might 
view politics today in ways which may be deemed more aligned to an art of the 
political than a science of it.  
 
One of the well referenced arguments from Claire Bishop in connection with 
Relational Aesthetics stems from an article written in the influential journal October 
in 2002, soon after the English translation of Bourriard’s work.5 Claire Bishop’s view 
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of the theory of Relational Aesthetics and some of the practices identified as 
exemplifying this phenomenon is that the model of social relation invoked by 
Bourriard lacks ‘resistance’ and the ‘antagonism’ that is constitutive of relation, as 
Bishop reads it via the political theorists, Laclau and Mouffe.6  To summarise, Laclau 
and Mouffe build a notion of political relationships and the social sphere or 
‘community’ on two principles, one a radicalisation of the idea of hegemony (the 
means by which the view of a particular group becomes ‘universalised’ as the 
‘dominant view) and the notion of the split or incomplete subject which derives from 
Lacan.  Laclau and Mouffe recognise the logic of capital as a logic of dislocation and 
dispersal which does not produce the formed political subject of the ‘proletariat’ 
which will stand up against capitalist relations but instead various subject groupings 
or groups whose interests relate through a model of ‘antagonism’ such that at any one 
time one particular interest group may attain partial ‘universalism’ and thus partial 
and momentary hegemony over others. Hegemony and the democratic consensus are 
thus never fully complete and always open to further contestation and antagonisms. 
Democracy is the continual drawing up of these antagonisms and partial subjectivities 
and subject identifications. Underpinning this model is the notion of the ‘failed’ 
subject from Lacan. The ‘subject’ is always held incomplete by the ‘other’ inscribed 
within it and unattainable. It is this very incompleteness which drives the subject to 
desire for identification.  
 
It is tempting therefore to ‘read’ the works here cited as in some sense ‘presenting’ 
along a spectrum of incisiveness perhaps from naïve conviviality to resistance to 
exploitation, the fragile articulations of partial identifications through antagonism 
upon which the ‘social’ realm or ‘community’ rests. However, it may be argued, there 
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is a need to read the works relation to the political with a far greater appreciation of 
the complexity arising from art’s ‘autonomy’ or ‘heteronomy’ with regard to the 
social and political.  
 
From a Marxist perspective what is at stake is less the question of politics and art in 
connection with the constitution of subjectivities and the discursivity of social 
relations, but instead the question of politics and of art as a question of the struggle 
over the commodity. As Stewart Martin suggests, “Whatever the marginality and 
precariousness of art’s relations to received ideas about politics, it is in many ways 
fundamentally constituted in the struggle over its subjection to commodification. So, 
if we think of the political in terms of this struggle, we can see art as politically 
formed to its innermost core. In a certain sense we can see art as a primal scene of 
politics in capitalist culture.”7 
 
The debate over the commodification of art (and hence its affirmative character in 
supporting capitalist social relations) or its intrinsic resistance to commodification is 
well known. What has become clear is that there is no simple ‘pure art’ or ‘anti-art’ 
position to be had.  
 
On the one hand, the anti-art position has had to confront the extent to which the 
dissolution of art into life is not simply emancipatory but a dissolution of art into 
capitalist life. It has also had to confront the extent to which capitalist culture has 
itself taken on this anti-art function to this end. This reveals a critical dimension to 
pure art, which the anti-art position must recognise if its critique of art is to function 
as a critique of commodification. On the other hand, the pure art position has had to 
 
 
 7 
confront the extent to which art’s purity is a form of reification deeply entwined 
within art’s commodification, indebted to capitalist culture. This requires that the 
defence of art against commodification must incorporate a dimension of anti-art if it is 
to criticise this entwinement. Either way, art’s resistance to commodification is 
obliged to take the form of an immanent critique or self-criticism. This suggests that 
the self-critical constitution of modern art is due to its commodity-form.8 
 
Art’s autonomy is intrinsically tied to its heteronymous determination by the social. 
Martin suggests that Bourriard’s concept of relational aesthetics and its theoretical 
elaboration presents the extreme counter  and in that sense the flip-side to Theodor 
Adorno’s concept of art’s ‘anti-social’ character. “Whereas Adorno seeks the critical 
force of art through the radicalisation of its fetishism against exchange, Bourriard 
seeks it through the radicalisation of its social exchange against fetishism.”9 
 
Between these positions we see the re-enactment of the two sides of the same coin; a 
dialectic of autonomy and heteronomy.  Thus for Martin, Bourriard’s investment in 
the capacity for relational art to eschew ‘the object’ and produce social exchange 
which ‘escapes’ the commodification of capital is found wanting.  We might say that 
Santiago Sierra’s works brings this weakness to the fore.  
 
In these works the re-direction of our attention from objects to subject does not 
produce a space of inter-subjective conviviality, but the instrumental commodification 
of labour that social exchange can be reduced to in capitalist societies. Art is stripped 
of its aura of free association and acts out a tragedy: the utopian conception of art, that 
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we should relate to it as if it were another person is realised in dystopian form, 
sweating in a cardboard box on a minimum wage.10 
 
I have sympathy with these readings but I want to provide another reading where the 
relationship between the political and the ethical may be further dwelt upon. However 
I do not mean an ethics of the present so much as the infinitely demanding and 
impossible ethics that Derrida’s thinking calls forth and to which I suggest art can 
ally.  
 
In Specters of Marx and other writings in which Derrida considers the political and 
‘democracy’, as democracy-to-come, the political is ethical through and through in a 
way which binds us to the other as an unnameable and inassimilable ‘other to come’ 
for which we have responsibility.11 This is very different from an ethics based upon 
the ultimately ‘autonomous’ subject with a conscience towards others, suggested say 
by the ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ dictum.  
 
The exorbitant ethical demand in Derrida’s work,  inscribed into the political, renders 
the time of the political a ‘time out of joint’, crossed by the impossibilities of 
redemption of the past or calculation of the future, if it is to be a ‘true’ politics 
unmarred by its violence towards the ethical. 
 
For Derrida, the political is the tracing of this gap between representation and the 
groundlessness it seeks to obscure, and this is worked through in relation to the 
various encounters with the representations that he writes and talks about. Our 
responsibility is towards the intimation of this differance and limit. It is a 
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responsibility because, within this gap, the exclusionary nature of our representations 
are opened to the other and the ‘time of the other’, as captured in Derrida’s important 
figure of the spectral and his resistance to ontology and, to an extent, materiality. Art 
is political in the sense that it is [not] representation but is capable of exceeding 
representation by‘re-marking’ the intimation of the relation between representation 
and its inassimilable ‘other’. 
 
Art is an encounter with the infinitely demanding and impossible to contain ‘other’, 
the ‘immemorial past’ and ‘always to come’ that is our responsibility; ‘that’ which 
calls for our unconditional hospitality and justice. 12 
 
Relational aesthetics may provide us with a means to reflect upon not what art 
‘presents’ or points to as a utopia of emancipation or its dystopian opposite but as an 
opening onto to responsibility.  
 
This is the distinction Simon Critchley makes between classical anarchism, concerned 
with freedom and struggles for ‘liberation’ and a different anarchism organised 
around responsibility, “an infinite responsibility that arises in relation to a situation of 
injustice.”13   
 
Critchley is interested in a new found anarchism as an ethical-political phenomenon, 
stemming from Levinas and his critique of the ‘archic’ subject as the sovereign 
subject. Rather for Levinas the subject is affected by its relation to the other in a way 
that refuses the self-positing sovereign subject; the subject is thus an ‘an-archic’ 
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ethical subject…untrammelled by a politics of state sovereignty or substantiated 
community as the ‘arche’ principle. 14 
 
I want to draw this together by returning to Tiravanija’s Untitled (Still) talked about 
most often in terms of the ‘gift’ of cooked food and the social exchange of eating 
together. 
 
In relation to this I want to bring together two statements: “If the relation to the real is 
the realm of the ethical, and the work of sublimation is the realm of the aesthetic, the 
aesthetic intimates the excess of the ethical over the aesthetic”;15 “The moral question 
is thus not, nor has it ever been: should one eat or not eat, eat this and not that…but 
since one must eat in any case and since it is and tastes good to eat, and since there is 
no other definition of the good, how for goodness sake should one eat well? And what 
does this imply? What is eating? How is this metonymy of introjection to be 
regulated? ... “One must eat well” does not mean above all taking in and grasping in 
itself but learning and giving to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat. One never eats 
entirely on one’s own: this constitutes the rule underlying that statement, “One must 
eat well.” It is a rule offering infinite hospitality.”16  
 
Insofar as the aesthetic “allows” us to encounter the infinite and exorbitant demand of 
the ‘other’ in a mode of sublimation, which “takes the human being to the limit of a 
desire which cannot be fully represented” and are “allowed a relation to (what Lacan 
calls) the Thing that does not crush or destroy us”, we ‘experience’ this ethical 
dimension.  However, understood this way it has the structure of tragedy about it and 
indeed of heroic sacrifice. Antigone is the paradigm of the ethical sublimated through 
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the aesthetic in Lacan’s Ethics of Psychoanalysis, for example. But the tragic replays 
the ‘arch’ of the ultimately self-possessing and ‘authentic’ subject. The tragic subject 
is he or she who struggles in the pitting of desire against necessity in order to achieve 
“authenticity”, even as this may be on behalf of the ‘other’. 17 
 
Derrida traces this paradigm of the authentic subject through the structure of sacrifice 
in relation to his meditation on eating well.  Insofar as the ethical subject is drawn 
from an essential ‘human’-ism it bears the trace of a structure of sacrifice, whereby 
the animal is understood to be sacrificed for the ‘good’ of the community and the 
animal is also an ‘introjected’ substance of food in many cultures. The ‘other’ is 
interiorised and assimilated into the ‘self-same’. Derrida refers to other modes of 
introjection through the mouth, symbolically, such as the bread and wine of Christ’s 
body and blood in the terms of this sacrificial structure through which “we” become-
subject through processes of “idealizing interiorisation”. 18To bring it back to politics 
this is Hegel’s ultimately underlying structure for the community and the state. 19 
 
Derrida’s huge question is, how do we remain open to the other, responding and 
responsible to the ethical demand in a situation of injustice and offer unconditional 
hospitality and “eat well”? This takes the question of ‘eating well’ and what it is to 
live well as an ethical being, which indeed is increasingly a subject of science and 
politics, even bio-politics, into a different dimension. 20 
 
Perhaps Tirvanija’s project gives us much more to think than we might have first 
thought? 
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